A software-defined radio can derail a US train by slamming the brakes on remotely
https://www.theregister.com/AMP/2025/07/14/train_brakes_flaw/
Neil Smith has been trying to get the railroad industry to listen since 2012, but it took a CISA warning to get there. ...
.. If a savvy person - Smith, for example – used an SDR to snoop on that traffic, they could ... remotely take control over a train's brake controller from a very long distance. You could induce brake failure leading to derailments or you could shut down the entire national railway system.. "
The journalist here really doesn't understand the technologies involved.
First, there's no way that an SDR(eiver) can hack anything. It only receives.
You'd need an SDT(ransmitter) or SDT(ransmitter)R(eceiver) to hack into anything radio-based. Maybe he's just referring to the ability to receive and decode the signals, but you'd still need to then transmit modified data.
It also sounds like you'd need physical access to the tracks and/or trains. Physical access is probably the simplest and yet strongest security measure of all.
Contrary to what movies and the press often implies, a lot of security breaches rely on physical access. Inside jobs make up most of the rest, such as passwords from disgruntled or bribed employees. Although you can't discount stupidity, in downloading malware or responding to phishing. It's actually really difficult to break into any system otherwise.
First, there's no way that an SDR(eiver) can hack anything. It only receives..... Maybe he's just referring to the ability to receive and decode the signals, ..
As the article states, independent studies have also confirmed it s valid vulnerability, but your right, it's only that the SDR is able to obtain the data required to enable a hacker to throw a monkey wrench in there.. provided he has access to the yards as well. It's not saying the SDR can directly do anything, only that it provides.a direct access to data that can be used to take control of the trains braking systems.